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RECENT CASES.
APPEAL-WAIVER-STIPULATIONS-AvoIDANCE-ARTHUR D. JONES Co. v.
SPoKANE VALLEY LAND & W. Co., 87 PAC. 65 (WASH.).-Held, that where par-
ties to a suit made a stipulation that any appeal taken from the judgment of
the trial court should be taken in time to be heard at a certain date otherwise
to be dismissed, a mistake by counsel as to the date of the commencement- of
the term was not a sufficient cause to avoid the dismissal. Fulton, J.i dis-
senting.
The right of appeal is favored in the law and will not be held to have been
waived except on clear and decisive grounds. Hixon 'v. Oneida County, 82
Wis. 520. Nevertheless, the right of appeal may be waived by an agreement
supported by sufficient consideration. Mackey v. Daniel, 59 Md. 484. But
not if agreement was the result of fraud, mistake, or surprise. Town of
Alton V'. Town of Gilmanton, 2 N. H. 520. Nor in criminal cases, Smith v.
Common'w-alth, 14 S. & R. (Pa.) 69. Such an agreement does not take
away the right of the court to review on writ of error. Putnam v. Churchill,.
4 Mass. 516. The attorney-general may waive his right of appeal by parol
agreement and the same is binding on his successor. Peo. v. Steplzens, 52
N. Y. 3o6. While there seem to be no cases involving mistake as applied to
an agreement of this kind, it has been held, in the absence of any agreement.
that an omission to file appeal papers owing to a mistake of fact, is not a suffi-
cient cause to avoid dismissal of the appeal. Gill v. Hudson, 14 La. 203;
Rain v. Thomas, 12 Fla. 493.
ASSAULT AND BATTERY-DAMAGEs-FRIGHT OF WIFE.-HuTcFRINSON V.
STERN, IOI N. Y. Sup. 145. -Held, that the plaintiff in an action for an assault
committed on him in the presence of his wife, cannot recover for injuries to
the wife, occasioned by fright, and subsequent loss of service of the wife.
Kruse and Spring, J.J., dissenting.
The general rule is that pain of mind is only the subject of damages when
connected with bodily injury. Mforse v. Duncan, 14 Fed. 396. However,
this is subject to the qualification that a recovery for mental injuries and suf-
fering alone is not precluded in cases of wilful tort. Williams v. Underhill,
7 N. Y. Sup. 291. So where plaintiff's wife was sick so that they could not
move at the termination of his lease, and defendant started to tear down the
house, exciting the sick woman and filling her room with dust, so that she had
to be removed and shortly died, the defendant was held liable, though
deceased suffered no immediate personal injury, and her death was due solely
to fright and excitement. Preiser v. Wielandt, 62 N. Y. Sup. 890. But
where the fright and mental suffering was not caused by a wilful tort but by
an accident, no act-on can be maintained to recover the damages thereby sus-
tained. Lehman v. Brooklyn City Ry. CO., 47 Hun. 355. No well consid-
ered case has held that fright alone, not resulting from some physical injury
to the person, will sustain an action fcr negligence. Ewing v. Pittsburg C.
and St. L. Ry. Co., 147 Pa. 40.
BILLS AND NOTES-IRREGULAR INDORSERs-LIABILITY-GOLDING SONS CO.
V. CAMER)N POTTEKY Co., 55 S. E. 396 (W. VA.).-Held, that when a payee
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does not indorse a promissory note, he may, in the absence of any agreement,
treat irregular indorses as joint promisors, or as guarantors, or as indorsers at
his election.
This case emphasizes a divergent view on a point about which the decis-
ions are inharmonious. The most widely prevailing view is that, under the
conditions set forth, an irregular indorser is presumptively either a joint
maker, Union Bank v. Willis, 8 Metc. (Mass.) 504; Hamilton v. Johnston,
82 Ill. 39, or a guarantor, Riggs v. Waldo, 2 Cal. 485; Harding v. Waters,
74 Tenn. 324. Some jurisdictions, however, hold that where the indorsement
was made to give the maker credit with the payee the irregular indorser is
liable as first indorser. Moore v. Cross, ig N. Y. 227; Blakeslee v,. Hewett,
76 Wis. 341. While other courts make the distinction that an irregular
indorser before delivery is a joint maker, an irregular indorser after delivery
a guarantor. Thomas v. Jennings, 13 Miss. 627; Powell v. Thomas, 7 Mo.
440.
C.14RtkERS -ACTION FOR INJURY TO PASSENGERS-NEGLIGENCE A MATTER OF
LAW-PITTSBURGH RY. Co. v. BLOOMER, 146 FED. 720 (PA.)-Held, where a
motorman started a street car forward without any signal from the conductor,
and a passenger alighting therefrom was injured, there being no conflict of
evidence on this point, the trial judge is justified in charging the jury as a
matter of law that the defendants were negligent.
It sometimes happens, when the facts are not ambiguous and there is no
room for two honest and reasonable men to arrive at different conclusions,
that negligence becomes a question of law for the judges to decide. Ry. Co.
v. Van Sternburg, 17 Mich. 99; Ry. Co. v. Stout, 17 Wall. 657. But there is
no general rule, the application of which will determine in every case, with
certainty, whether the inference as to negligenceto be drawn from ascertained
facts, is one of fact or of law. Farrell v. Waterbury Horse Ry. Co,, 6o Ct.
239. The mere finding of all the facts by the court does not make negligence
a question of law, for such a course would speedily put an end to all jury trials.
Williams v. Clinton, 28 CL 264; Fiske v. Bleaching Co., 57 Ct. ixg. Nor is
it true that when the court finds facts undisputed, the question of negligence
is necessarily one of law. Ry. Co. v. Van Steinburg, 17 Mich. 99; Warton
on Neg. Sec. 420. But where there has been a clear breach of legal duty and
special findings of fact are made by the court, it may hold negligence to be a
conclusion of law. Nolan v. Ry. Co. 53 Ct. 461; Beardsley 71. Hartfort, 50
Ct. 529. This is a much more simple question when the measure of duty is
precisely defined by law. Then a failure to attain that standard is negligence
in law. Beach on Contrib. Neg., See. x63.
CARRIERS-DISCRIMINATION-CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DEPRIVATION OF PROP-
ERTY-LouISvILLE & N. R. Co. V. CENTRAL STOCKYARDS CO., 97 S. W. 778.
(Kas.),Const. Sec. 213 requires all railroads to transfer, deliver and switch empty
or loaded cars coming to or going from any railroad with equal promptness
and dispatch, and without discrimination, and to deliver, transfer, and trans-
port all freight from and to any point where there is a physical connection be-
tween the tracks of such carrier and those of a connecting carrier. Held, that
the performance of the duties imposed by such section did not deprive the
carrier of his property without due process of law, though the performance
thereof put the carrier to an increased expense and necessitated its parting
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with the possession and control of its cars for a reasonable time, while they
were in the possession of a connecting rival carrier. Barker, J., dissenting.
The above case is one of decided interest especially at this time on account
of the great discussion in regard to the various phases of interstate commerce
and its increasing importance. A consignor of goods, after they have passed
from the bands of the R. R. Co. with which the contract of affreightment was
made, into the hands of another Co., has the same right to change their des-
tination while in transitu, as if the first Co., had a continuous line to the place
of destination, Penn. R. R. Co. v,. Rennock, 51 Penn. 244; 4 Kan, 378. Contra,
Childs v. Digby, 24 Penn. St., 23. But the contention of the dissenting judge
is that there is a taking of private property without the owner's consent and
for the private use of another which is not due process of the law and there-
fore a violation of the i4th Art. of the Constitution of the U. S. and he quotes
the famous case of Loan Association v. Topeka, 20 Wall, (U. S.) 655 to sub-
stantiate this proposition. However the greater weight of authority follows
the majority opinion of the judges in this case.
CARRIERS-WHO ARE PASSENGERs-FIT MAURICE v. N. Y. N. H. & H. R. R"
CO., 78 NORTHEASTERN 418 (MASS). In this case the person injured as the re-
sult of a collision had obtained a ticket by presenting to the agent a forged
certificate that she was under eighteen, and a pupil in a certain school, the
railroad having contracted to convey pupils at reduced rates. Held, that the
carriage of the person was brought about by fraud and that she was not a
passenger. See Comment ante.
CHARITABLE INSTITUTIONS-INJUEIZS TO SERVANTS-HEWETT V. WOMAN'S
HOSPITAL AID Ass., 64 ATL. 190 (N. H.)-Held, that a hospital conducted as a
charity is liable for the negligence of its manager in failing to notify a nurse
of the contagious nature of a case assigned to her. The court points out that
the hospital is incorporated under a general charter, and that although it has
no capital stock and made no division of profits, and all its property was de-
voted to charitable uses, it is liable, and cites a number of English and
American cases. The court also rejected the contention that as the plaintiff
was an apprentice learning a trade, she was not a servant, and that the cor-
poration was therefore relieved of its ordinary duty to her in that capacity.
CONSPIRAcY-RIGHT To EXCLUDE PERSON FROM THEATRES-PEOPLE EX REL.
BURNHAM v. FLYNN-IO0 NEW YORK SuPP. 3r. The defendants con-
spired to prevent the plaintiff from exercising a lawful trade or calling. Be-
cause of various criticisms made of the plays given at the various theatres, the
defendants had given instructions that the critic should not be admitted, and
he had been forcibly prevented from entering after purchasing a ticket. Held,
that the conducting of a theatre is a private enterprise, and that, in the absence
of Statutary regulation, the proprietor has the right to say who shall enter.
Under this doctrine the court states that the agreement to exclude the critic
was not an unlawful one, and that if his presence was distasteful as injurious
to their business the proprietors had the lawful right to agree to exclude him.
CORPORATIONS-CORPORATE EXISTENCE-COMMONWEALTH Ex. REL. ATTORNEY
GENERAL V. MONONGAHELA BRIDGE Co., 64 ATLANTIC 909 (PA.) The city of
Pittsburg bought all the shares of the capital stock of the stockholders of a
bridge company. Held, that all the shares of a corporation are held by one
person does not effect the existence of the corporation.
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A corporation, other than a joint-stock corporation, may be dissolved by
the death of all its members or the withdrawal of all its members, or of such a
number of its members that too few remain, under the constitution of the
corporation, to continue the succession and file vacancies, Blackwell ,. State,
36 Ark. 178; PIdli4s v. Wickham, x Paige 59o (N. Y.) But it is not dissolved
by the fact that all the shares of its capital stock have come into the hands of
a single stockholder, or of a less number of stockholders than were required
by the statute in the formation of the corporation. In re Belton, 47 La. Ann.
16r4; Louisville Banking Co. v. Eisenman, 94Ky. 83. Although under such
circumstances, corporate action may be suspended, Swift v. Smith, 65 Md.
428, and a surrender of a charter by a corporation may be presumed from a
neglect, for a long time, to choose corporators, State v. Trustees of Vincen-
nes University, 5 Ind. 77. A corporation composed of many stock-holders
may be dissolved by an individual obtaining possession of all the stock, In re.
Bellona Co., 3 Bland 442 (Md.) This last decision was rendered in 1831, and
then represented a minority rule, but the general tendency since has been to
reject it and now it is doubtful if there is any minority rule on this subject.
Bridge Co. v. Traction Co., r96 Pa. 25; .4Morawetz on Private Corhorations,
1o9, XO Cyc. 1277. It makes no difference in principlewhether the sole owner
of the stock of a corporation is a man or another corporation, Exchange Bank
v. Construction Co. 97 Ga. 1-6.
CRIMINAL LAW-DEATH SENTENCE FOR LIFE CONvIcT-BRowN v. STATE, 95
SOUTH WESTERN io39. (TEx.) -Held, that although one is serving a life sen-
tence for murder, such previous conviction does not constitute a bar to a second
prosecution for murder, which may result in conviction and a death sentence
may be put into effect immediately.
CRIMINAL LAw-LARCENY-STEALING GAs.-WooDs V. PEOPLE, 78 NORTH-
EASTERN, 607 (ILL.)-Held. that the occupant of a building who removes the
meters and substitutes rubber hose connections, is guilty of grand larceny as
feloniously taking the personal goods of another. The defendant's plan was
to remove the meter as soon as the gas inspector had read it, and connect the
pipes by means of rubber hose, this connection being left in place until near
the time for the reappearance of the gas man, when it was removed and the
meters replaced. It was also held in this case that in ascertaining whether
the value of the gas taken was sufficient to make the offense grand larceny,
the value of the gas consumed upon a number of consecutive days should be
added together, and that the gas taken on each separate day did not consti-
tute a separate offense. It was further held that in ascertaining the value,
the jury should be guided by the selling price and not by the cost price of the
gas.
DEAD BODIES--MUTILATION-DAMAGES-MENTAL ANGUISH.-LONG ET AL. V.
CHICAGO, R. I. & P. R. R Co., 86 PAC. 289 (OrL.)-Held, that the parents
of a deceased child are not entitled to damages for mental pain caused by the
mutilation of the dead body of the child.
Cooley, in his work on torts, p. 280, says: ". the owner of the lot
in which the body was deposited might maintain trespass quare clausum for
its disinterment and recover substantial damages, in awarding which the
injury to the feelings would be taken into consideration." It logically follows
that a court that would allow damages for mental anguish caused by mutila-
tion after burial would also allow the same damages for mutilation before
288 YALE LAW JOURNAL
burial. And in accordance to this principle it was 
held in Renhei v.
Wright, 25 N. E. 822 (Ind.), decided in i8go, in a case parallel to the 
present
one, that mental anguish should be considered in awarding 
damages. Also
Wadsworth v. Telegrafih Co., 86 Tenn. 695, where there was no 
pecuniary
loss but only mental pain. Damages for mental anguish 
have been grant(d
by the current weight of authorities. Bessemer Land 
and Imp. Co. v. Jen-
kins, iix Ala. I35; Am. &- Eng. Ency. of Law, Vol. 8, p. 54 (2nd edition);
Koerber v. Pateh. 102 N. W. 4 o (Wis.); Thurfield v. Mountain View 
Ceme-
tery, 12 Vt. 76. That a corpse is pers-mal property is held in 
Bogart v. City
of Indianapolis, 13 Ind. 135. Also a very strong case in favor of 
damages for
mental pain is Larson v. Chase, So N. W. 238.
EMINENT DOMAIN-RIGHT OF WAY THROUGH 
CEMETERY. R. R Co. v.
FOREST HILL CEMETERY CO., 94 SouT171WESTERN 69 (TENN.) -Held, that 
"the
wheels of commerce must stop at the grave." It was sought 
to have a right
of way for the railroad condemned through a portion of the 
cemetery which
had not as yet been used for burial purposes, for the reason 
that other avail-
able rights of way would be more difficult and more expensive 
to prepare.
HUSBAND AND WIFE-POwER TO CONTRACT.-MATTHEWSON 
V. MATTHEV-
SON, 79 CONN. 23. An action by a wife against her husband 
to recover the.
amount of a promissory note given to her. -Held, the right 
to make a con-
tract carries with it a right to sue for its violation.
A contract between husband and wife is valid and an action 
for breach
will lie, George v. High, 85 N. C.. g. Husband may lawfully 
borrow money
from his wife and thereby become her debtor, Rowland v. Plummer, 
50 Ala.
182. Where a husband borrowed money from his wife and 
gave his note, de-
claring it belonged to her separate estate, his estate is liable. 
Brjyants
Adm'rs v. Bryant, 66 Ky. (3 Bush.) I55. Also the husband's note is valid.
Logan v. Hall, 19 Ia. 491. The husband's estate is liable for loans 
from the
wife, Whitford v. Daggett, 84 Ill. 144; Johnston's Adm'rs v. Johnston, i
Grant's Cases, 468 (Penn.). It has been held that when a wife loaned money
to her husband and he used it to pay off mortgages on property 
owned by
both, that the wife could recover from his estate. Greiner v. Greiner, 35
N. J. Eq. (8 Stew.) i34. The husband's parol promise to repay a loan to the
wife will be enforced in equity, Schaffner v. Renter, 39 Barb. (N. Y.) 44;
and though there be no formal agreement or promise to repay, 
it was held
to be a loan. McNally v. Weld, 30 Minn. 2o9. No express promise 
to pay
is needed, it will be implied. Steadman v. Wilbur, 7 R. I. 481. It has 
been
held where money is loaned by the wife to the husband an action 
cannot
be maintained in law or in equity against his person or estate. 
Wood-
ward v. Sfiurr, 141 Mass. 283. A woman cannot contract with or sue her
husband. Fowle v. Torrey, 135 Mass. 87.
MASTER AND SERVANT-INJURIES TO SERvANT-AssUMPTION OF RISK-
SWARTS v. R. M. WILSON MFG. CO., ioo N. Y. Supp. io~.-Held, that where
an experienced servant complained on Monday of the manner in which 
the
machine he tended was operated, and the master promised to remedy the
matter on the following Saturday, and he was injured in the meantime owing
to the condition complained of, he did not assume the risk. Nash and
Williams, JJ., dissenting.
Cases on this point are in conflict. As a general rule if a servant con-
tinues in the service of his employer after he has knowledge of any unsuitable
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appliances in connection with which he is required to labor, and it appears
that he fully comprehends and appreciates the nature and extent of the
danger, he will be deemed to have assumed all risks incident to the service
under such circumstances. Conley v. American .Exfiress Co., 87 Me. 352;
Marsh v. Chickering, iox N. Y. 396. Meador v. Lake Shore and Mich.
South. Ry. Co. 138 Indiana 290, holds that where an employe, whose duties
require him to use a ladder, discovers that the ladder is defective and danger-
ous, and notifies the master, who promises to furnish another, but before do-
ing so the employee, in using the defective ladder is injured, the master is not
liable, although the service in which the ladder was used was of a kind which
could not be postponed. A workman is under no obligation to continue work-
ing in a dangerous place of employment. If he does so, with every oppor-
tunity to know the danger he cannot excuse his own want of care in failing to
notice and guard against it, by alleging that his employer promised to do this
and had failed to observe his promise. Reese v. Clark, 146 Pa. 465. Snow-
berg v. Nelson---Sfencer Pafier Company, 43 Minn. 532, holds, however, like
the case in point, that the alleged promise of the defendant to remedy the de-
fects and his request to plaintiff to continue using the machinery until he
should remedy it. brings the case within the recognized exception to he
general rule that a servant who uses defective machinery, knowing of the de-
fects, and the con.equent danger, does so at his own risk. St. Clair Nail Co.
v. Smith, 43 Ill. App. Io5, and T. & N. 0. Ry. Co. v. Bingle, 9 Texas Civil
App. 322 are also in point.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-EMPLOYERS-CMPENSATION-MAY V. CITY OF
CHICAGO-78 N. E. RaP. 912 (ILL.) A regular employe in the Collector's
office did extra work for which he was promised extra compensation by the
Collector. Held, that he was not entitled to it.
Employes in a city department are not entitled to extra compensation
even though detailed and requested by the head officer of such department.
Bruns v. City of New York, 6 Daly (N. Y.) 156; Merzback v'. City oJ New
York, 30 N. Y. Supp. 908. By the doing of extra work in making a digest of
the laws, an attorney for the city cannot recover extra compensation. Hays v.
City of Oil City, Ivi Atl. 63; or other extra work. People v. Sufervisors, i
Hill (N. Y.) 362. When a Solicitor does extra professional work he does ac-
quire the right to additional compensation, City of Baltimore v. Ritchie, 51
Md. 233, the same being held when a health officer performed extra duties,
Wendell v. City of Brooklyn, 29 Barb (N. Y.) 204; and also in the case of a
city treasurer for extra work, City of Covington V. Maybury, 9 Bush (Ky.)
304. A person accepting a public office at a fixed salary cannot claim ad-
ditional compensation for extra work even though promised by a committee.
Evans v. City of Trenton, 4 Zab (24 N. J. L.) 764. It has been held, how-
ever, that when a clerk does extra work, the additional sum so earned, is
treated as an increase in salary which is allowed, providing the head officer of
the department keeps his expenses within the limits of the appropriation.
P.o~le 2'. Corwin 29 N. Y. Supp. 1077. Where duties are foreign to those for
which he was employed he can recover for such extra work. City of Detroit
v. Redjfeld, i 9 Mich. 376.
NEGLIGENCE-DANGEROUS MACHINERY-CARE REQUIRED-PLACES ATTRAC-
TIVE TO CHILDREN. MCALLISTER V. SEATTLE BREWING AND MALTING CO., 87
PAC. 68 (WASH.) Held, that where dangerous machinery of a character
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likely to excite the curiosity of children, is left unguarded in an exposed pace,
where children are liable to be, though on the premises of the owner, and a
child attracted to it is injured, the owner is liable.
Although a railroad company is not bound to the same degree of care in
regard to mere strangers, who are on its premises, that it owes to others, yet it
is not exempt from liability to such strangers for injuries arising from its
negligence. R. R. Co. v. Stout, I7 Wall. 657. The cases following the above
seem to be of two classes; the first, being based on the proposition that when-
ever a dangerous machine, attractive to children, and where they are wont to
play, is left unguarded it is the duty of the railroad to keep it in a safe condi-
tion. R. R. Co. v. Stout, sujfra. R. R. v. Bailey, xi Neb. 333. The second
class is based on the theory of constructive invitation, i. e., if one is allured or
attracted cn to the premises, he is not a trespasser, and leaving an unguarded,
attractive machine is such. KIefe v. Milwaukee &- St. Paul Ry. Co., 21
Minn, 207. The fact that a child is a trespasser willnot necessarily preclude
him from a recovery against a party guilty of negligence. Birge v. Gardner,
17 Conn. 507. Some States, however, contrary to the general rule, hold that
he cannot recover. Daniells v. R. R., 154 Mass. 349; Frost v'. R. R., 64
N. H. 220.
PARENT AND CHILD-CUSTODY OF CHILD.-WORKMAN V. WATTS, 54 SOUTH-
EASTERN REP. 775 (S. C.) Parents of a child placed her in the custody of her
grandparents in her infancy and she was supported and educated by them till
nearly fourteen years of age; at which time the parents sought possession of
the child, who expressed under oath a desire to remain with her grandparents.
There was no unfitness of either party shown. Held, that she would be
allowed to remain with the grandparents.
We meet the old common law rule which gives the custody of the
children to the father as against the mother and especially as against
third persons, Johnson v. Terry, 34 Conn. 395. Unless it is of tender
years, and its parents are separated. Gray vi. Field, 19 W'k'l'y. Law Bul. 121.
Yet the father may deprive himself of this right by ill-fitness or
voluntary transfer of his right of custody, Bently v. Terry, 59 Ga. 555; but
this transfer is invalid if the child is over fourteen years of age and it was
done without the child's consent. State v. Smith, 6 Me. 462. There is a
difference of opinion among the States as to the legal possibility of the transfer
of the custody. As to this, the minority rule has been gradually disappearing.
Some of those States have held that in such a transfer, there is a lack of
mutuality and such an agreement is voidable as a delegation of powers.
Foulke v,. Peofile, 4 Colo. App. 5i9, Ward v,. Peofile, 3 Hill 395. But those
jurisdictions, which allow the transfer by the parents, hold it is not revocable
unless some sufficient legal reason is shown. Janes v. Cleghorn, 54 Ga. 9;
State v. Barney, 14 R. I. 62. Thisview has been developed farther and by
the great weight of authority the Court will not restore the child unless it
is for the benefit of the child, Peoaile t. Lohman, 17 Abb. Prac. 395. In such
a case, the wish of the child is almost controlling, unless under tender age for
then the welfare of the child must not be placed in jeopardy by the exercise of
an immature judgment, Curtis v. Curtis, 71 Mass. 535.
PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-EXISTENCE OF AGEqCY.-AGLE IRON Co. v. BAUGH,
41 SOUTH. REP. 6b3. (ALA.)-Held, that the authority of an agent cannot be
established by the declarations of the alleged agent.
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The fact of the agency or the nature and extent of the authority
cannot be established by the agent's own declarations. Whiting v.
Lake, 91 Pa. 349; nor by his correspondence. Hill v. Helton, 8o
Ala. 528; and this rule is just as inflexible in not allowing it proved
by his affidavit, Bowen v. Powell, x Lans. I. This is far from say-
ing that an agent is an incompetent witness to prove the fact of the agency or
authority. Where parol evidence, as to the existence of the agency or extent
of the authority, is admissible at all, the agent is as competent a witness as
any other person to testify under oath to facts within his knowledge touching
the agency, Rice v. Gore, 22 Pick. i58; Indianafiolis Chair Mfg. Co. v.
Swift, 132 Ind. 197. Even the old rule of evidence, which excluded the testi-
mony of a party in interest, made an exception in favor of the evidence of an
agent produced to prove the fact of the agency, i GreenleafEvid. 416;
Thayer v. Meeker, 86 Ill. 470. And this applies equally when a husband is the
agent of his wife or a wife of her husband, Roberts v. N. W. Nat. Ins. Co.,
90 Wis. 21o. But if the authority be conferred in writing, parol evidence of
any kind is generally inadmissible. Neal v. Patten, 40 Ga. 363; unless it be
where the question of authority is only incidentally involved, Columbia
Bridge Co. v. Geisse, 38 N. J. Law 39.
RAILROADS-REGULATIONS-STOPPING FAST MAIL-INTRSTATE COMMERCE
RAILROAD COMMISSIONERS V, ATLANTIC LINE Ry. Co., 54 S. E. 224 (S. C.).-
Where accommodations furnished citizens of the state by an interstate railroad
are inadequate, held, a writ of mandamus compelling the company to stop
two fast mails or else furnish other equal facilities, is not an unreasonable
burden on interstate commerce.
Congress alone has the power to regulate interstate commerce, Const.,
Art. I, Section 8, and when state legislation is in its essence and of necessity
a regulation of interstate commerce, it is an encroachment upon the power of
Congress over the subject, and is therefore void. Cooleys Princifiles of
Const. Law, page 7r. However, this must be distinguished from mere local
aids for its improvement. County Mobile v. Kimball, 102 U. S. 691, 702.
For, while a statute interfering with the mails of the U. S. has been consid-
ered not within reasonable police regulation and void; Ill. Cen. R. R. v. Ill.,
163 U. S. 142; yet a statute directing that passenger cars should be heated by
stoves has been held to be a proper police regulation. N. Y., N. H. and H.
R. R. v. N. Y., x65 U. S. 628. And, although state regulations, if local in
their nature and adapted to the locality, will not be considered void, Cooley
on Const. Law, page 71, yet a state may not, under the cover of exerting its
police powers. substantially prohibit or burden interstate or foreign com-
merce. Ry. Co. v. Husen, 95 U. S. 465. So while the cases seem to hold that
local regulations are reasonable as long as they do not directly interfere with
interstate commerce; whether the stopping of mail trains is such a regulation
seems to be a matter of doubt.
REAL PROPERTY-TITLES BY PosSEssION-RIGHTS OF SQUATTERS.-LINK V.
BLAND, 95 SOUTHWESTERN 1iio (TEx.).-Held, that a squatter may secure
title to land after ten years' possession in spite of the fact that he took posses-
sion of the land without any claim of right and with the intention of holding
the land if possible against all other claims. In this case the land belonged
to a railroad company, and the claimant is given title to a quarter section
which he cultivated and used as his homestead. The decision conforms to
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previous decisions of the Texas court, and is made in spite of the statutory
definition that adverse possession must be an actual and visible appropriation
of the land, commenced and continued under a claim of right inconsistent
with and hostile to the claim of another.
RESTRAINT OF TRADE-CONTRACT TO SECURE TRAFFIC-VALIDITY.-DELA-
WARE, L. & W. R. Co. v. KUTrZR, 147 FED. 5r. Defendant railroad company
entered into a contract with plaintiff to build up, develop, and conduct the
business of the transportation of milk on its lines of road. Plaintiff was to
have full charge of such business and was to receive as a compensation a per-
centage of the freights earned thereon. Held, that such a contract was not
void as being in restraint of trade nor contrary to the anti-trust act to protect
trade and commerce against unlawful restraint and monopolies.
The contracts prohibited by the anti-trust act of July 2, 189o, are simply
those void under common law. U. S. v. Trans-Missouri Freight Asso., 58
Fed. 58. And at the present day the mere fact that a contract to some
degree restricts trade is not sufficient to avoid it. Central Shade Co. v.
Cushman, 143 Mass. 353; Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. I5. In order to be
illegal such contracts must involve an appreciable diminution of the number
of the persons engaged in the trade or of the supply furnished. Fowle v,
Park, 131 U. S. 88; Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, xo6 N.Y. 473. So that
each particular case must rest upon its merits and all the surrounding circum-
stances must be considered in determining whether a contract will operate as
a restraint injurious to the public.- Gibbs v. Consolidated Gas Co., 130 U. S.
396; Oregon Steam Na. Co. v. Winsor, 20 Wall. 64.
REWARDS-OFFER AND ACCEFTANCE.-MCCLAUGHREY ET AL.V. KING, 147 FED.
463.-Where defendant as sheriff of a county, offered a reward "for the arrest
of each of the parties convicted" of a certain bank robbery and murder, Held,
that the reward was not accepted merely by the giving of information con-
cerning the whereabouts of the suspect, who was already under arrest in
acother state, but could only be accepted by the party assuming the personal
danger and responsibility of either actually arresting the suspect or causing
some other person to arrest him. Hook, J., dissenting.
As a general rule it may be stated that one who offers a reward may an-
nex such conditions as he chooses, and one claiming the reward must prove a
compliance with them. Amis v. Conner, 43 Ark. 337. And it has been held
that a reward offered for the apprehension and conviction of each of the per-
petrators of a crime is not earned by one who merely informs the governor of
the state that one such person is in the penitentiary of another state, and who,
without risk, responsibility, or expense to himself appears as a witness at the
trial. Lovejoy v. A. T. and S. F Ry Co., 53 Mo. App. 386. Nor is a reward
offered for the capture of a thief earned by merely giving information to the
sherriff which enables him to find and arrest him, Everman v. Hyman, 3
Ind. App., 459; and this, although the party giving the information went with
sheriff as one of his posse, to make the capture. Juniata Co. v. McDonald,
122 Pa. St. 115.
SALES-CONVERSION OF GOODS BY CARRIER.-DUDLxY v. CHICAGO, MILWAU-
KEE & ST. P. Ry. Co., 52 SOUTHEASTERN, 718-A quantity of apples was shipped
with drafts on the buyer for their value according to a contract of sale at-
tached to the bills of lading. On the arrival of the fruit at its destination the
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railroad company permitted the buyer to inspect the apples without his pro-
ducing bills of lading or showing any right or title to the apples. Finding
them to be of inferior quality, the buyer refused to take them. Held, that the
railroad company is not guilty of a conversion of the goods.
SALES-RIGHT TO REGULATE RESALES AND PRICE.-HARTMAN V. JNO. B.
PARK & SoNs Co. 145 FED. 358 (Ky.) Held, that contracts between the manu-
facturer and wholesalers to sell at a certain price and only to retail dealers,
designated by the manufacturer should be sustained. The court disposes of
the defense that the contracts were unlawful, as in restraint of trade, by a
holding that the restraint in order to be unlawful must be unreasonable.
SHIPPING-VALIDITY OF CONDITIONS IN TICKET-LIMITATIONSOF LIABILITY-
TH MINNETONKA, 146 FED. 5og-Held, conditions printed inconspicuously
upon a steamship ticket, providing that the shipowner shall not be liable for
any loss of passenger's baggage through theft or any act, neglect or default of
the shipowner's servants or others, which were not known to such passenger
are invalid, and constitute no defeus to an action by him to recover jewelry
stolen by one of the ship's employes.
As a general rule in the United States, a shipowner or other common
carrier cannot, by stipulation in a contract of carriage, limit its liability for
injury to goods of a passenger caused by the negligence or theft of its seivants,
on the ground of public policy. The Hugo, 57 Fed. 403; Armstrong
v. Exfiress Co., 159 Pa. 640. Yet a rule that carriers will not be responsible
for baggage beyond a certain amount unless its value is reported to them and its
carriage paid for, is reasonable and obligatory if known to or brought home to
the knowledge of the passenger. Brown v. Eastern R. R., It Cush. 97,
Brehme v. Dunsmore; 25 Md. 328. The carrier is under the same obligation,
ordinarily, for the safety of luggage as of freight. Hannible Ry. Co. v. Swift,
12 Wall. 262. Mierrill v. Grunell, 3o N. Y. 594. However, for such baggage
as a passenger keeps in his own possession, a carrier is not liable as insurer
but only for negligence. Steamshifi Co. z,. Bryan, 83 Penn. St. 446; Whitney
v. Pullman Co., 143 Mass. 243.
TIME-SoLAR OR STANDARD-COURTS-EXPIRATION OF TERM-TEXAS TRAM
AND LUMBER CO. v. HIGHTOWN, 96 S. W. 1071 (Txx.)-He/d, that in limiting
the time of the expiration of a term of court limited by statute to a certain
day, solar time and not standard or railroad time, should be used, though the
community has generally adopted standard time.
A civil day is the mean solar day used in ordinary reckoning of time be-
ginning at midnight. Webster's Int. Dict. The only standard of time
recognized by the courts is the meridian of the sun, and an arbitiary standard
set up by persons in a certain line of business will not be recognized. 2o Am.
and Eng. Ency. 2nd Ed., 21o. The time to be used in determining
he expiration of a policy on a certain date will, in the absence of statute or
Custom be determined by the common or solar time unless it is shown that a
different time was intended. Jones v. Ins. Co., 110 Ia. 75. The cases on
the above point are very few bLtt it seems to be settled as a general rule
that solar time is to be used and is so decided as a matter of law
in Georgia. In Nebraska it is merely a presumption, while in Kentucky and
Iowa, a matter of custom. Ins. Co. v. Peaslee Gaulbert Co., i L. R A.
(N. S.) 364.
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TRADE MARKS AND TRADE NAMES-TITLE OF PUBLICATION. NEW YORK
HERALD V. STAR Co. z46 Fed. 204 .- Held, that complainant was entitled to
protection in the trademark "Buster Brown," tital of a comic section of a
newspaper, as having used it exclusively for such a length of time as to ac-
quire a proprietary right therein.
A sign, symbol, word or device which indicates origin or ownership of
articles manufactured or sold, or an arbitrary symbol to distinguish avendible
commodity is alegal trademark. Burton v. Stratton, 12 Fed. 696
Gowans v. Aklbrn Bros., 4 Kulp. (Pa.) Vx. This is true independent of any
statute. L. H. Harris Stove Co. v. Stucky, 46 Fed. 624, La Croix v. May 15
Fed. 236. The title in the main case is not merely descriptive words, S#reker
v. Lash, 102 Cal. 38; C. F Simmons Medicine Co. v. Mansfleld Drug Co.,
93 Tenn. 84; and the right to its exclusive use does not rest upon any property
right therein, but upon priority of use and application as in the manner used
by complainant, Walton v. Crowley, Fed. cases No. 17,133. Still such use
may give rise to property rights which the law protects, Clark v. Clark, 25
Barb. (N. Y.) 76. A trademark is not essentially exclusive, Clark Thread
Co. v. Armitage, 67 Fed. 9o4, only the particular application is protected,
Amoskeag Mfg. Co. v. Trainer, ioi U. S. 57; and only at the residence of.
the user, Sarton v. Schoder, io N. W. (Iowa) 516. Registration may be re-
required for full protection. Whittier v. Dietz, 66 Cal. 78.
TRADE-MARKS AND TRADE-NAMES-UNFAIR TRADE-REPAIRS FOR UNPAT-
ENTED MACIIINE.-ENTERPRISE MFG. CO. v. BENDER, ETAL.. 148 FED. 313 (0.)-
Complainant manufactured and sold an unpatented meat chopper called the
', Enterprise," which name was registered'as a trade-mark, and also parts for
replacing those that had become worn, which were marked with complainant's
name. Defendants also made such replacing parts, selling them in packages
marked to show for what machine they were made and by whom, but the
parts themselves were not identified by any mark. Held, that defendants,
while having the right to make and sell the parts, were not entitled to do so
without clearly marking the same to prevent their being mistaken by retail
purchasers for those made by complainant for its own machines.
In the absence of a patent the freedom of manufacture cannot be cut
down under the name of preventing unfair competition. Singer Mg. Co. v.
June Mfg. Co., 163 U. S. x6g. But in making such article the public must
not be led to believe it the product of another, Schener v. Muller, 74 Fed.
225. It is enough that such similitude exists as would lead an ordinary pur-
chaser to suppose that he was buying the genuine article and not the imita-
tion; and it is not necessary that the resemblance should be such as would
mislead an expert. Shaw Stocking Co. v. Mack, 12 Fed. 707. The primsry
object and purpose of such mark, name or symbol is to distinguish each of the
articles to which it is affixed from like articles produced by others, seems to be
the clear consensus of all the cases which are authoritative, Canal Co. V.
Clark, i3 Wall. 311; Mill Co. v. Alcorn. 150 U. S. 460.
WATERS AND WATER COURSES-NAVIGABLE RIVERS-RIPERIAN RIGHTS.-
KINKEAD v. FURGESON, IO9 N. W. (NEB.) 7 4 4 .- Held, that where the Missouri
river suddenly changes its course and abandons its former bed, the rcspective
riparian owners are entitled to the possession and ownership of the soil for-
merly under its waters as far as the thread of the stream.
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The common law rule was that on navigable rivers the riparian propri-
etor's ownership extended merely to the high-water mark and the test of navi-
gability was the ebb and flow of the tide. 3 Kent. 52t; Middleton v. Pritch-
ard, 3 Scam. (I1.) 51o. Some of the courts in this country have accepted this
test of navigability and hold that in all rivers in which the tide does not ebb
and flow the riparian proprietor's ownership extends to the thread of the
stream. Jackson v. Hathaway, 17 Mass. 288; Gavet v. Chambers, 3 Ohio,
495. Other jurisdictions, however, have insisted upon a broader test as to
navigability and maintain that where rivers are in fact navigable the riparian
proprietor's ownership extends only to high-water mark. Elder v. Burrus,
6 Humph. (Tenn.) 358; Pollard v. Hogan, 3 How. (U. S.) 212.
WITNESSES-COMPETENCY-HUSBAND AND WIFE.-BIANCHI ET ux v. DEL
VA=, 42 SoUTHERN 148 (LA.).-Held, that a husband cannot be a witness
for or against his wife in a matter affecting her paraphernal rights.
At early common law husband and wife were unable to testify for or
against each other, this being based principally on public policy. Wilson v.
Sheppard, 28 Ala. 623.
The common law disability has been removed and to-day a husband may
be a witness for his wife in many cases. Laudy v. Kansas City, 58 Mo. App.
141; Evans v. Evans, i5 Pa. 572. However, it has universally been held that
a husband cannot testify for wife when the suit concerns her separate estate.
Berlin v. Cantrell, 33 Ark. 611; Palmer v. Henderson, 2o Ind. 297.
WRONGFUL DzATH-ACTION BY NoN-REsIDINT ALIEN.-ATCHISON, T. & S.
F. R. R. Co. v. FAJARDO, ET AL., 86 PAC. 301.-Held, that non-resident
parents can recover for death of son under Kansas statute, Code Civ. Proc.,
Section 422, granting right of action to personal representative for wrongful
death of the deceased if the latter could have maintained an action had he
lived.
Unless the statute in plain terms excludes non-resident beneficiaries they
are entitled to sue as if they were residents. 8 Am. &- Eng. Ency. o] Law,
9oS. An administrator appointed in Colorado can sue for wrongful death in
Kansas. Kan. Pac. R. R. Co. v. Cutter, i6 Kan. 569 (1876). Resident of
Missouri can recover for wrongful death of husband, a resident of Missouri, in
Kansas. Chicago, R. I. &- P. R. R. v. Mills. 57 Kan. 687 (1897). Similar
statute entitles resident of Itaty to bring an action. Pittsburgh, C. C. &- St.
L. R. v. Naylor, 73 Ohio St. iiS. A non-resident alien can bring an action
for wrongful death. Szymanski v. Blumenthal, et al., 52 Atl. 347 (Del.);
Alfson v. Bush Co., 75 N. E. 230. A resident of another state can sue.
Denick v. Central R. Co., 103 U. S. ii; Higgins v. Central New Eng. &.
W. R. Co., 24 N. E. 534; Jefersonville. Madison, etc., R. Co. v. Hendricks,
Admr., 41 nd. 48. Exemption to "every person who has a family" may be
claimed by a non-resident. Siroul V. McCoy, 26 Ohio St. 577. A statute
purporting to apply to everyone may be taken advantage of by non-resident
aliens. State v. Smith, 12 Pac. 121.
